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Abstract
In this study, we examine the ways in which user attitudes towards privacy
and security relating to mobile devices and the data stored thereon may impact
the strength of unlock authentication, focusing on Android’s graphical unlock
patterns. We conducted an online study with Amazon Mechanical Turk (N =
750) using self-reported unlock authentication choices, as well as Likert scale
agreement/disagreement responses to a set of seven privacy/security prompts. We
then analyzed the responses in multiple dimensions, including a straight average of
the Likert responses as well as using Principle Component Analysis to expose latent
factors. We found that responses to two of the seven questions proved relevant
and significant. These two questions considered attitudes towards general concern
for data stored on mobile devices, and attitudes towards concerns for unauthorized
access by known actors. Unfortunately, larger conclusions cannot be drawn on the
efficacy of the broader set of questions for exposing connections between unlock
authentication strength (Pearson Rank r = −0.08, p < 0.1). However, both of
our factor solutions exposed differences in responses for demographics groups,
including age, gender, and residence type. The findings of this study suggests that
there is likely a link between perceptions of privacy/security on mobile devices
and the perceived threats therein, but more research is needed, particularly on
developing better survey and measurement techniques of privacy/security attitudes
that relate to mobile devices specifically.
*Article to appear at the Workshop on Usable Security (USEC), Feb. 2018
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1 Introduction
In order to protect sensitive data stored on or accessed via a mobile device, such as a
smartphone, knowledge-based authentication methods (e.g. use of PINs, stroke-based
patterns) or biometric methods (e.g. fingerprints) can be used to verify the identity of
the user, thereby enabling the device to be unlocked. Research suggests that attitudes
to securing mobile devices are known to differ among users [19, 17, 14, 18, 33, 1, 34].
Although locking behavior is often practiced, annoyances have been found with the
process [19, 1, 34]. While not averse to locking a mobile device, Egelman et al. [14]
identified lack of motivation as one factor deterring participants in their study from
securing their technologies. Calculated decisions were made by some participants,
depending on the perceived effort required to lock devices. Deterrents have also been
attributed in part to the absence of threats to security, along with negative perceptions of
the security of lock screens [17].
For purposes of unlocking a mobile device, many Android users have the option of
using stroke-based patterns which can be entered via the interface. The user is required
to connect a sub-set of four or more pre-selected contact points arranged in a 3x3 grid
in the correct sequence to authenticate entry. However, studies have shown that in
practice, only a small number of distinct patterns are selected from the 389,112 choices
available [6]. The majority of these user-selected patterns can be easily guessed with
roughly the same difficulty as guessing random 3-digit PINs [4, 39]. While the threat
of observer and smudge attacks exist when using a locking mechanism, the benefits
often outweigh the impact of losing sensitive data for potential abuse by third parties.
Prior work in the area has often focused on the factors impacting locking compliance or
lack thereof [19, 17, 14, 18]. Although limited in number, studies have been conducted
examining security and privacy attitudes associated with locking behavior [1, 34].
However, research has yet to be undertaken to directly connect security/privacy attitudes
with passcode strength.
In this paper, we describe a study examining the ways in which users select authenti-
cation stimuli, notably Android’s graphical password system or “pattern unlock” based
on their attitudes towards a set of security and privacy prompts concerning information
privacy on mobile devices. We collected and analyzed a large dataset (n = 750) of
self-reported Android unlock patterns/statistics regarding pattern choice and correlated
that data with agreement/disagreement responses to a set of privacy prompts related to
the privacy of data stored on mobile devices.
The goals of this study are twofold: first we hypothesized that there is a relationship
between privacy attitudes regarding mobile devices and the security of the authentication
stimuli selected (H1), and second we hypothesized that there may be demographic
factors (e.g., age, location of residence) that may affect security and privacy responses
(H2). As our questionnaire is short in design, the hope is that these prompts can be used
as starting point to design more advanced measurement techniques, or more directly, a
subset of these questions could be used at device set-up time (or during a security audit)
to better understand user motivation and potentially nudge users towards secure choices.
We conducted per-prompt analysis, an analysis of averages of the scores, and used
principal component analysis (PCA) to expose any latent factors in the data. The PCA
analysis explained 55% of the variance for a two factor solution with high internal
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consistency for each factor solution (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7) and low correlation (likely
independence) between the factors (Spearman Rank ρ = 0.09, p < 0.05). The two
different latent factors identified different aspects of participant response, particularly
around aspects of present vs. external threats to security/privacy. A similar dichotomy
was found when identifying connections to unlock authentication strength.
The overall results, using the entirety of the questions to predict users with weaker
unlock strengths, are unfortunately inconclusive as the correlation effect is small (Pear-
son Rank r =−0.08, p< 0.1) with a weak effective size. We argue, though, that the
results are encouraging for the potential of such a link between security/privacy attitude
and unlock authentication may be present, if more advanced measurement methods
were developed.
The results of the survey do provide a path forward in identifying better honed mea-
surement methods when analyzing the response to individual privacy/security prompts.
Two such prompts had statistically significant differences with regard to the reported
strength of the authentication patterns. In particular, an agreement with general concern
for privacy of data stored on mobile devices and concern of unauthorized access from
known actors (e.g., friends and family) led to stronger authentication choices (p< 0.05).
In analyzing other relationships between the participants and the privacy prompts,
we show that our two factor solutions found using PCA exposes interesting demographic
differences in our responses. In particular, Factor 1 solution correlated more with the
strength of the reported results, our second factor solution, Factor 2, better separated the
respondent’s attitude with respect to their age and willingness to provide a pattern or
statistics about those patterns for the experiment.
To summarize, the paper makes the following contributions and findings:
• An analysis of the efficacy of a short privacy/security questionnaire regarding
threats to mobile devices.
• Exposing latent factors via PCA that describe clear difference in participants
between present and external threats to mobile device security.
• Demonstrating correlations between latent factors of the survey with demographic
information, particularly age and location.
• Identifying the connection of individual questions to unlock authentication strength,
but inconclusive results for the entirety of the prompts.
Based on these results, we conclude that while we suspect that a relationship between
authentication choice and security/privacy attitudes of mobile devices seems probable,
we were not able to find enough evidence here to draw strong conclusions. Further
study is needed, and we show a number of promising directions regarding measurement
methods that could be applied to expose this link. In particular, there are encouraging
findings with respect to specific prompts, as well as when applying factor analysis to the
entire set of privacy prompts. This suggests that using a short survey to better understand
user perceptions regarding privacy on mobile devices could be possible and would be a
useful tool in directing users in a personalized way, based upon their own security and
privacy perceptions, towards more secure choices.
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2 Related Work
Researchers have aimed to optimize both security and usability for mobile unlocking
mechanisms, through extensive studies examining both attitudes and usage behaviors
relating to securing mobile technologies. In terms of attitudes, mobile device users
have been found to express concerns about security [27] and make clear demands for
protection against unauthorized use [13]. However, difficulties have been experienced
when complying with general security guidance, such as updating passcodes [13], even
if users are ‘tech savvy’ [27]. Research suggests that a number of mobile device users
prefer not to lock their devices [14]. Reasons for this include concerns about emergency
personnel not being able to identify them, not having their devices returned if lost, and
not believing they had any data worth protecting. Lack of motivation and awareness
were also found to be reasons behind lack of compliance in a study by Qiu et al. [36]
The usability challenges (i.e., the time taken to use locking screens) were identified by
Malkin et al. [33] as deterrents for locking. When examining perceptions in more detail,
Egelman et al. [14] identified a strong correlation between use of security features and
risk perceptions, which indicates rational behavior. The researchers also observed that
most users likely underestimate the extent to which data stored on their smartphones
pervades their identities, online and offline. Hayashi et al. [20] found that most of the
participants in their study wanted at least half of their applications to be accessible
without requiring an unlock code, which according to Egelman et al. [14], suggests
opportunities for improving current locking mechanisms.
Studies have examined a range of factors which may play a role in impacting
privacy and security attitudes. For example, Benensen et al. [7] conducted a study to
identify whether mobile device users utilizing different operating systems had varying
perceptions of security. Findings from their study showed that 20% of Android users
and 5% of iOS users were privacy aware. Mare et al. [34] examined the impact of age,
among other factors, on attitudes to privacy and security. The researchers identified that
teenage users and not just adults were interested in these areas. However, teenage users
were thought to have less useful understandings of how to achieve it.
Studies have been conducted to investigate locking behaviors by users from eight
countries (e.g. [18, 33]). Findings revealed that level of protection varies by location.
Participants in most non-U.S. countries were between 31% and 76% more likely than
Americans to have a secure lock screen. Age and sex were also thought to play a
role in determining locking behavior. Reasons for lack of compliance appeared to be
similar across participants from most countries examined [18]. Egelman and Peer [15]
examined the impact of individual differences on privacy and security attitudes. The five
factor model, often used to examine the impact of these differences on decision making,
was found to be a weak predictor of privacy preferences and behaviors. The researchers
identified that decision-making style and risk-taking attitudes are strong predictors of
privacy attitude.
Qiu et al. [36] have focused on recording and analyzing locking behaviors among
mobile device users. These include the length of unlocking and interaction sessions
with the devices, outcomes (failed/succeeded) of the unlocking attempts, type of locking
mechanism (e.g. manually or through auto-lock), participants’ attitudes of sharing
their devices with other people, device locations and information gathered from ac-
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Reported Reported
n= 750 Statistics Pattern Urban Suburban Rural Male Female
Participants 307 443 278 330 142 407 343
18-24 58 148 83 90 33 123 83
25-34 134 228 143 154 65 199 163
35-44 85 52 41 66 30 67 70
45-54 24 13 8 18 11 17 20
55-64 5 2 3 2 2 1 6
65+ 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
Urban 119 159 170 108
Suburban 133 197 173 157
Rural 55 87 64 78
Male 153 254 170 173 64
Female 154 189 108 157 78
Table 1: Participant demographics for those that only reported statistics on their authen-
tication pattern and those that reported their authentication pattern.
celerometers/gyroscopes, the model of the device and its screen size. Although the
study has yet to be completed, the findings would offer interesting insights to interface
designers aiming to develop security solutions to better meet the needs of mobile device
users. Hintze et al. [21] also examined usage behavior when using mobile devices.
Findings showed that a noteworthy amount of users do not lock their devices after usage,
increasing the possibility of malicious interaction with the device when considering
unlocked usage, as devices stay unlocked for a short period afterwards.
In terms of challenging perceptions of risk, concerns and attitudes to screen locking,
Albayram et al. [1] presented a video to participants based on ’fear appeal’ highlighting
the potential consequences associated with poor locking compliance. The video was
found to significantly affect levels of perceived severity, vulnerability, and response
efficacy. The researchers suggest that risk communication can effectively change risk
perception, which can be a key to promoting secure behavior such as the use of a secure
screen lock mechanism on smartphones.
3 Methodology
The goal of this research was to determine if security and privacy attitudes towards
data stored on mobile devices impact the strength of chosen passcodes. Our primary
result involved the analysis of participants’ agreement/disagreement with statements
regarding information security/privacy of mobile phones (on a Likert scale). This type
of approach has been used by other researchers in prior work [11, 28, 31, 8, 12]). Some
of those participants also self-reported their mobile device unlock passcode (an Android
graphical pattern) in addition to reporting their agreement/disagreement with the privacy
statements, allowing us to compare their privacy sentiment with regards to their mobile
device and the relative strength of their passcodes.
To measure the strength of the reported passcodes, we use password guessability
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metrics [9, 35, 23] and particularly the guessing methods developed in related work [4,
39] trained using non-overlapping data of user-generated passcodes obtained from the
same related work [39, 30, 40]. All the data collection methods were reviewed and
approved by our institutions’ IRBs.
3.1 Self Reporting Passcodes
This study builds upon the analysis and data collection conducted previously by Aviv
et al. [4, 5]. The study was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and participants
who self-identified as Android mobile device users were recruited with the following
prompt:
You will be asked to (optionally) self-report what your Android unlock
pattern is, or report statistics about your pattern. If you do not use the
Android unlock pattern, please do not complete the HIT.
Participants entering the survey were aware of the nature of the study and what was
going to be asked of them. This may have provided a bias to the results as those opting-in
may have been less privacy conscious then those opting-out; however, the option to not
report a pattern and still complete the survey allowed for more privacy conscious users
to participate. The statistics that participants reported about their patterns included the
start contact point and whether any of a pre-selected set of tri-grams were present, i.e., a
connection of three contact points, but were not required to reveal their precise pattern.
Both those who reported their actual pattern or statistics were compensated equally,
$0.75, for their participation and fully completing the survey.
Once the HIT was accepted, the structure of the survey was as follows:
1. Informed Consent: Participants were made aware of the intent of the survey, the
data collection and protection procedures, and the kinds of information that would
be collected.
2. Demographic Information: Participants answered background questions about
their age, gender, and place of residence, either rural, suburban, or urban. Partici-
pants were limited to U.S. areas using Amazon Mechanical Turk’s settings.
3. Pattern/Stats: Participants were given the option to either report statistics about
their Android unlock pattern or report their actual pattern.
4. Privacy Prompts: Participants were asked to rate their agreement/disagreement
with the privacy prompts (see below for specific prompts).
5. Confirm/Attention Tests: At the end of the survey, participants were asked to
re-enter their pattern (or stats) and answer a question about providing truthful
responses. Participant data was removed if the participant failed to confirm the
same pattern/stats or answered negatively to the truthfulness question. Seven
participants were excluded for this reason.
Further, participants were required to complete the entirety of the survey on an
Android device. The survey, including pattern entry screens were written using a
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combination of JavaScript, PHP, and HTML, and run completely within a browser on a
mobile device. Once the HIT was accepted, the participants were provided with a link
to visit on their Android device’s browser window. To ensure that participants used an
Android device, the user-agent header was checked. While the user-agent header
can be spoofed, it is likely more burden than it is worth given the compensation for the
survey of $0.75. Participants who did not own an Android device should have returned
the HIT in order to complete other tasks.
The demographics of the study are presented in Table 1, and in total 750 individuals
participated in the study, 443 of which also self-reported their authentication passcode
for their Android unlock pattern.
3.2 Security/Privacy Prompts
Each participant, regardless of if they self-reported a unlock pattern, were provided with
the following prompts/questions which they responded disagreement/agreement with
on the following scale: “Strongly Disagree,” “Disagree,” “Neither Agree nor Disagree,”
“Agree,” or “Strongly Agree.”
• Q1: I am concerned about the privacy of the data stored on my mobile device(s).
• Q2: I am more concerned about the privacy of the information stored on my
mobile device as compared to my laptop or desktop.
• Q3: I am more concerned about the privacy of the information stored on my
mobile device as compared to information stored online.
• Q4: I am concerned about identity theft.
• Q5: I am concerned about my privacy online.
• Q6: I am concerned about unauthorized access to my device by known actors
(people I know, for example, friends, family, and my peers).
• Q7: I am concerned about unauthorized access to my device by unknown actors
(people I don’t know, for example, police, government, and corporations).
Based on the responses, a security/privacy attitude average can be calculated by assigning
a value of 1 to “Strongly Disagree,” 2 to “Disagree,”3 to “Neither Agree nor Disagree”,
4 to “Agree”, and 5 to “Strongly Agree” that related to the general privacy attitude of a
participant as it relates to information stored on mobile devices. For those participants
that also self-reported their authentication passcode, we next analyzed the strength of
that passcode as it related to their security/privacy attitudes.
While other published scales have been used by researchers to determine percep-
tions/attitudes towards security/privacy, such as the ones described by Buchanan et
al. [10], Malhotra et al. [32], Kumaraguru and Cranor [25]-(Westin Primary Segmenta-
tion index), and others, some parts of these scales are out of date, not focusing on mobile
devices (and aspects of unlock authentication) or were deemed to be prohibitively long
for a participant to take on a mobile device. Instead, we developed our prompts from
prior published privacy scales for computing, generally [11, 28]). We do not imply
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Figure 1: Magnitude of responses to each question prompt for those that reported
statistics and those that reported patterns, where: SD is “Strongly Disagree,” D is
“Disagree,” N is “Neither Disagree nor Agree,” A is “Agree,” and SA is “Strongly
Agree.”
that these prompts provide complete clarity of security/privacy attitudes. However,
they do expose some key aspects of the mental models of users. For example, the
difference between security/privacy of data stored on the device vs. security/privacy of
data stored online, as well as the difference between unauthorized access by unknown
actors and known actors. Further, as we will discuss in the next section, we found ac-
ceptable internal consistency with two different factors, similar to that of other published
security/privacy questionnaires.
4 Identifying Latent Factors
As a first step in the analysis, consider the results in Figure 1 for a general overview of
the responses to each of the privacy prompts. Clearly observed is the fact that there are
varied distributions in the responses, by which some of the participants were strongly
in agreement for most of the questions, while other questions provided more varied
responses. The variance of the responses is not ideal as some questions have mostly
agreement or strong-agreement (Q1, Q4, Q5, and Q7), while others show more spread
variance (Q2, Q3, and Q6). To better identify the impact of all the prompts, i.e., to find
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F1 F2
Q1 -0.411 -0.245
Q2 -0.435
Q3 -0.401 -0.114
Q4 -0.290 -0.411
Q5 -0.282 -0.255
Q6 -0.458 0.812
Q7 -0.328 -0.176
Table 2: Weighting for the two factors found via PCA where 1 is “Strongly Disagree”
and 5 is “Strongly Agree”. The Cronbach α > 0.7 (acceptable) for these values
an appropriate weighting, we can apply a naive method or a more advanced factor-based
analysis.
The naive method for computing a quantitative privacy response into a continuous
variable for each participant is to simply take the average of each of the responses to
each of the questions, on a scale from 1 to 5, which we refer to as the privacy average.
A privacy average across the prompts of 5 would indicate strong agreement with all
the prompts, and a 1 would indicate strong disagreement. Values in-between would
indicate a more nuanced perspective, but likely shifted towards more agreement or less
agreement with the prompts. We apply this quantization in much of analysis and justify
it through principal component analysis to follow.
As a more advanced technique for determining appropriate weighting of the ques-
tions in computing a continuous value, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to
identify latent factors in the responses and the associated question weights (loading)
that lead to high internal consistency in responses between questions. This is a common
technique for verifying privacy scales, and we follow the verification technique in prior
published work, particularly that of Buchanan et al. [10].
Just as in Buchanan et al. [10], we required a loading greater than 0.3 for a Varimax
analysis, which left us with a three-factor solution. Further we used Saucier’s criteria and
then Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7 to determine factor purity, after which we were left with
two viable factors. The loadings of each of the factors are presented in Table 2. Factor
1 (F1) had a Cronbach alpha of 0.74 and Factor 2 (F2) had a Cronbach alpha of 0.71.
Comparing the two-factor solutions, we find that they are weakly correlated. Figure 2
plots the factors in 2D space, and shows the weak negative correlation (Spearman rank
of ρ =−0.09, p< 0.05), suggesting that each factor is exposing different latent factors
of the. As ρ is quite small, these two factors are exposing different aspects of the
responses, and overall, 55% of the variance is explained by the two factor solution.
Observing the loadings, F1 is very similar to the privacy average metric described
previously because each of the questions are loaded at nearly equal weight, but the
loading is all negative. Since the contribution of each of the questions is significant
and none are significantly greater than any other, it suggests that using an average of
the results provides a reasonable and straightforward quantitative measure of privacy
attitudes based on the question prompts.
The F2 solution provides a very different loading. Question 2, which compares the
privacy of information stored on the mobile device compared to a laptop or desktop,
9
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Figure 2: A scatter plot of two factor solution correlation. The two factors are weakly
negatively correlated based on Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ = −0.088,
p< 0.05).
does not contribute to the solution based on the minimization criteria requiring high
internal consistency. While Q2 contributes highly in F1, it does not provide any loading
in F2. Instead, Q6 and Q4 have the largest impact, one positive and one negative,
respectively.
These two questions, Q6 and Q4, highlight one of the big dividers we found in
this survey: present vs. distant threats. Q4 refers to the risk of identity threat, which
mostly occurs from unknown actors, while Q6 refers to the threat of unauthorized
access by familiar, known actors, like friends and family. When the external threat
factor is combined with the other negatively loaded factors, which all deal with external
threats to data security and privacy, it is clear that F2 is picking up on differences
between participants fears of known vs. unknown actors. As we will show, F2 provides
significant differences in results when considering the willingness of demographic
factors, particularly surrounding age.
5 Guessability Metric
For the strength metric of Android unlock patterns, we use guessability [9, 35, 23].
Guessability is a metric that describes how many guesses would an informed attacker
require to guess a user’s password in an offline setting.
The guessability metric requires the creation of a guessing algorithm which outputs
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a series of guesses in order of most likely used passwords to least likely used passwords.
Prior work in this space has provided a framework for designing these algorithms [4, 39]
which require training data. One advantage present for studying Android unlock patterns
is that, unlike text-based passwords where there are essentially an unbound number
of passwords, for Android unlock patterns there are finite number of patterns, exactly
389,112 [6]. Thus, it is possible to develop a complete ranking of patterns using a
guesser.
The best known guessing algorithms [4, 39] leverage the properties of commonly
selected patterns, such as the Z- and M-shaped patterns (and rotations/flips thereof), to
construct a Markov model based on transitions within the pattern grid space. Recall
that Android unlock patterns require connecting a set of 3x3 grid points in a continuous
gesture without repetition or avoidance. The order in which those grid points connect is
well modeled using a bi-gram transition matrix of likelihoods, where the likelihoods are
measured based on training data. Additional probabilities considering the start point,
end point and the length of the pattern can also be modeled using similar measures.
Once the model is constructed, all 389,112 possible patterns (enumerated using brute
force, as in Aviv et. al [6]) are analyzed using the Markov model, producing a likelihood
score. Ranking the patterns based on this likelihood score provides a guessability metric
where lower values indicate patterns that are more likely to be guessed and higher values
indicate patterns that are less likely to be guessed.
We followed the Markov model construction from prior work by Aviv et al. [4]
(particularly the pen-and-paper data). In addition to training the model using the
Android unlock patterns used in prior collections, we also trained the Markov model
on patterns provided via Uellenbeck et al. [39]. As a limitation, these models change
over time as more training data is available; however, repeated observations of user
choice in Android unlock patterns find that the set of common patterns appears to be
consistent [2, 37, 41, 30, 40].
6 Results
6.1 Demographic Differences in Responses
Figure 1 provides the general overview of the magnitude of responses for participants to
the security/privacy prompts. The figure separates by two groups: those willing to self-
report their authentication passcode (or pattern) and those unwilling. The willingness
to reveal this information could also be considered a sensitivity regarding security and
privacy, and we present the statistical analysis in Table 3.
An omnibus MANOVA test showed no signficant differences between these groups.
Additionally, the Factor 1 (F1) solution also showed no statistical differences between
the responses of participants who were or were not willing to provide a pattern for
analysis. Interestingly, the Factor 2 (F2) solution does show a significant difference
that is not present in prior tests. This result suggests that F2 is capturing some more
difference between the willingness of those to share information about their authenticator
than what is simply captured under an average of the responses.
While we found no significant differences with respect to gender (see Table 4), we
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Reported Statics Reported Pattern t-test
Q1 µ = 3.90,σ = 0.97 µ = 4.01,σ = 0.94 p= 0.135
Q2 µ = 3.25,σ = 1.22 µ = 3.34,σ = 1.14 p= 0.319
Q3 µ = 2.95,σ = 1.14 µ = 3.04,σ = 1.11 p= 0.284
Q4 µ = 3.90,σ = 0.98 µ = 4.00,σ = 0.87 p= 0.135
Q5 µ = 4.05,σ = 0.83 µ = 4.12,σ = 0.76 p= 0.266
Q6 µ = 3.33,σ = 1.27 µ = 3.22,σ = 1.18 p= 0.229
Q7 µ = 4.14,σ = 0.90 µ = 4.04,σ = 0.99 p= 0.137
avg µ = 3.65,σ = 0.65 µ = 3.68,σ = 0.64 p= 0.474
F1 µ =−9.36,σ = 1.75 µ =−9.44,σ = 1.70 p= 0.521
F2 µ =−1.95,σ = 1.08 µ =−2.12,σ = 1.00 *p= 0.033
Table 3: Security/Privacy average per question/prompt comparing those that reported
statistics about their authentication to those that self-reported their actual authentication
pattern. Data was normal (p< 0.01) according to Anderson-Darling test. Performed
MANOVA tests, differences across responses were not significant (Z∗ = 14.07,α =
0.056).
Male Female t-test
Q1 µ = 3.97,σ = 1.00 µ = 3.92,σ = 0.91 p= 0.460
Q2 µ = 3.23,σ = 1.20 µ = 3.35,σ = 1.17 p= 0.163
Q3 µ = 2.98,σ = 1.16 µ = 2.99,σ = 1.10 p= 0.951
Q4 µ = 3.90,σ = 0.97 µ = 3.98,σ = 0.88 p= 0.239
Q5 µ = 4.08,σ = 0.82 µ = 4.08,σ = 0.78 p= 0.993
Q6 µ = 3.31,σ = 1.22 µ = 3.26,σ = 1.25 p= 0.540
Q7 µ = 4.15,σ = 0.90 µ = 4.03,σ = 0.98 p= 0.069
avg µ = 3.66,σ = 0.63 µ = 3.66,σ = 0.66 p= 0.940
F1 µ =−9.39,σ = 1.69 µ =−9.39,σ = 1.77 p= 0.941
F2 µ =−2.00,σ = 1.07 µ =−2.04,σ = 1.04 p= 0.569
Table 4: Security/Privacy average per question/prompt comparing male and female
responses. Data was normal (p< 0.01) according to Anderson-Darling test. Performed
MANOVA tests, differences across responses were not significant (Z∗ = 14.07,α =
0.093).
did observe differences within other demographic groupings. The reported location
of participants (Urban, Sub-Urban, vs. Rural) showed significant differences for the
factor results and under MANOVA tests (p = 0.012); post-hoc, one-vs-all analysis
suggests that Urabn respondents differed significantly compared to other groupings
(see Table 5). This is also captured using the F1 weighting and using the average of
responses, as expected given the generally smooth weighting of F1. In analyzing the
questions, using a Bonferoni correction, Q2 (more concern about security/privacy on
mobile vs. desktop/laptop) and Q6 (more concern about known actors vs. unknown
actors) showed the most differences for these groups. While we exclude Q3 (more
concern about privacy on mobile vs. online) due to the correction, it is worth noting that
it does seem to have some impact on differentiating respondents and is highly weighted
under F1, so is considered well in that comparison.
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Urban Sub-Urban Rural ANOVA
Q1 µ = 4.04,σ = 1.00 µ = 3.92,σ = 0.91 µ = 3.85,σ = 0.99 p= 0.114
Q2 µ = 3.37,σ = 1.18 µ = 3.15,σ = 1.18 µ = 3.42,σ = 1.20 *p= 0.024
Q3 µ = 3.07,σ = 1.20 µ = 2.86,σ = 1.05 µ = 3.09,σ = 1.15 p= 0.032
Q4 µ = 3.94,σ = 1.01 µ = 3.94,σ = 0.85 µ = 3.94,σ = 0.96 p= 1.000
Q5 µ = 4.13,σ = 0.84 µ = 4.04,σ = 0.74 µ = 4.09,σ = 0.86 p= 0.411
Q6 µ = 3.43,σ = 1.23 µ = 3.15,σ = 1.22 µ = 3.32,σ = 1.23 *p= 0.017
Q7 µ = 4.13,σ = 0.97 µ = 4.12,σ = 0.86 µ = 3.98,σ = 1.05 p= 0.249
avg µ = 3.73,σ = 0.70 µ = 3.60,σ = 0.56 µ = 3.67,σ = 0.71 *p= 0.04
F1 µ =−9.59,σ = 1.86 µ =−9.20,σ = 1.51 µ =−9.43,σ = 1.89 *p= 0.02
F2 µ =−1.95,σ = 1.07 µ =−2.10,σ = 1.04 µ =−1.96,σ = 1.05 p= 0.09
Table 5: Security/Privacy average per question/prompt comparing locales. Data was
normal (p< 0.01) according to Anderson-Darling test. Using MANOVA indicates that
there are significant differences across responses (Z∗= 23.68, p= 0.012), and post-hoc
analysis (one vs. all) suggests that responses from Urban participants were significantly
different. Using a Bonferoni correction, Q2 and Q6 show significant different responses
within questions. F1 comparisons also suggest significant differences.
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 ANOVA
Q1 µ = 3.89,σ = 1.02 µ = 3.91,σ = 0.99 µ = 4.05,σ = 0.83 µ = 4.19,σ = 0.65 p= 0.407
Q2 µ = 3.21,σ = 1.25 µ = 3.30,σ = 1.18 µ = 3.45,σ = 1.13 µ = 3.08,σ = 1.07 p= 0.302
Q3 µ = 2.88,σ = 1.19 µ = 2.92,σ = 1.13 µ = 3.26,σ = 1.01 µ = 3.24,σ = 1.02 *p= 0.017
Q4 µ = 3.87,σ = 1.03 µ = 3.96,σ = 0.94 µ = 3.97,σ = 0.78 µ = 4.03,σ = 0.75 p= 0.814
Q5 µ = 4.01,σ = 0.90 µ = 4.09,σ = 0.80 µ = 4.15,σ = 0.65 µ = 4.14,σ = 0.58 p= 0.439
Q6 µ = 3.51,σ = 1.24 µ = 3.25,σ = 1.25 µ = 3.23,σ = 1.15 µ = 2.84,σ = 1.05 *p= 0.003
Q7 µ = 4.22,σ = 0.87 µ = 4.02,σ = 1.00 µ = 4.14,σ = 0.86 µ = 4.11,σ = 0.86 p= 0.080
avg µ = 3.66,σ = 0.69 µ = 3.64,σ = 0.65 µ = 3.75,σ = 0.56 µ = 3.66,σ = 0.50 p= 0.385
F1 µ =−9.40,σ = 1.85 µ =−9.33,σ = 1.74 µ =−9.63,σ = 1.50 µ =−9.34,σ = 1.37 p= 0.477
F2 µ =−1.79,σ = 0.96 µ =−2.03,σ = 1.13 µ =−2.16,σ = 0.97 µ =−2.52,σ = 0.85 *p< 0.001
Table 6: Security/Privacy average per question/prompt comparing Age. Age ranges for
55+ were excluded to limited sample size. Data was normal (p < 0.01) according to
Anderson-Darling test. Using MANOVA indicates that there are significant differences
across responses (Z∗ = 23.68, p = 0.012), post-hoc analysis (one vs. all) suggest
that responses from 18-24 and 45-54 were significantly different. Using a Bonferoni
correction, Q3 and Q6 show significant difference in responses. Additionally, F2
captures differences in age well, again, 18-24 and 45-54 showing the most difference.
When comparing age groups (see Table 6), again we see that particular questions
expose significant differences between the groups, supported under MANOVA analysis
(p= 0.012). Post-hoc MANOVA analysis, using a one-vs.all method, suggest that 18-24
and 45-54 age groups were significant different in responses to other respondents. In
particular, for older participants (45-54) there is more agreement with Q3 regarding
more concern for the security/privacy of data stored on mobile devices as compared to
data stored online, but younger participants (18-24), however, show more disagreement,
suggesting that they may be more concerned with their online footprint. Further, there
is a divide regarding Q6, known vs. unknown actors. Younger participants show more
security/privacy concern regarding unauthorized access from both known and unknown
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threats, and are particularly sensitive to known actors as compared to other groups.
The second factor solution (F2) also exposes an overall difference in the secu-
rity/privacy sensitivity for age. Recall that more negative responses correlated with more
security/privacy sensitivity, and we see an increase in that sensitivity (more negative)
for increased age. Looking at the weightings to questions within F2, the response to
Q1 (concern about security/privacy), Q4 (identify threat), and Q5 (online privacy) are
the most strongly negative within the F2 solution. The result may indicate that these
security/privacy threats resonate more strongly with older participants and that F2 is
capturing that.
As a limitation to these results from age and location, there is overlap between
individual groupings in these statistical tests, e.g., more young people live in urban
settings, so results may be oversampling a sub-group of the population. Even correcting
for that, across the hypothesis (using smallest p-values), it would suggest that Q2, Q3,
and Q6 play the most significant individual roles; this is further supported in the PCA
weightings for both F1 and F2 solutions.
6.2 Guessability Strength
In Figure 3, a scatter plot is presented which depicts the PCA two factor solutions
for each participant who self-reported a pattern compared to the guessing number
(log scale). Using Pearson Correlation (on the non-log guess values), we found that
there exists a small correlation between the average security/privacy response and
the guessing number (r = −0.08, p < 0.1) for F1. This suggests that as individuals
express stronger security/privacy preferences (more negative results in F1 indicates more
agreement with the security/privacy prompts), there is a small increase in self-reported
passcode strength, as represented in the guessing number. We acknowledge that this
is a limited and disheartening small effect and possibly inconclusive or a negative
result, but this and other results do suggest that there likely exists some correlation
between security/privacy attitudes and security of authentication choice under the right
measurement circumstances. Our intuition for there likely being a connection is due
to the responses to individual questions with regard to the security of authentication
choices.
Breaking down the results further per question to analyze the attitudes towards
specific security/privacy prompts that have the largest impact. Figure 4 displays a
box-and-whisker plot of the guessing numbers for self-reported patterns broken down by
response within each question prompt. To measure significance, we performed a Mann-
Whitney U-test (guessing numbers are not necessarily normally distributed) within
group analysis comparing the guessing number of participants who expressed agreement
(“Agree” or “Strongly Agree”) with those that express disagreement (“Disagree” or
“Strongly Disagree”). We do not include the neutral (“Neither Agree nor Disagree”)
group in this analysis. In total, we make 7 hypothesis tests over the same overlapping
data (namely guessing numbers) that examine whether agreement/disagreement of
the prompt impacts guessing number, and as such, we consider significance with a
Bonferroni correction. Table 7 displays the primary results.
We find that in the case for question prompt Q1 and Q6 there is a significant
difference between individuals who agree/disagree and the security of self-reported
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of factor solutions to the guessing number of reported patterns.
There is a negative correlation of r =−0.08 using Pearson rank for Factor 1 with small
a effect with a small, an inconclusive effect size p< 0.1, leading to a potential negative
result. No potentially significant correlation for Factor 2 was found.
Android unlock patterns; however, with Bonferroni correction with m = 7, a weak
significance of α = 0.1 occurs when p< 0.014 so the effect may be limited. Recall that
Q1 refers to a general concern with the security/privacy of data stored on mobile devices,
and Q2 refers to concern with unauthorized access by known actors (e.g., friends, family,
coworkers). In analysis with Q1, although the Mann-Whitney U-test is compatible with
unequal group sizes, it is important to note that there were only 56 participants in the
Disagree/Strongly Disagree category as compared to 351 in the Agree/Strongly Agree
category, limiting the power of the test. However, for Q6, there is a more balanced
sample (albeit still unequal). While the power of the test for Q6 is reduced by Bonferroni
corrections, it does suggest that there are factors in the mental model of the threat—is it
someone I know?—that could impact the authentication choices and requires further
investigation.
7 Limitations
There are a number of limitations in this study that are worth noting. Foremost is
that the data relies on both self-reported attitudes towards privacy prompts as well as
self-reported authentication choices. While it could be the case that individuals are
not forthcoming, the reported authentication choices are in line with other published
results [4, 39, 38, 3].
Additionally there may be selection bias in that participants that are more willing to
participate in the survey may already be less privacy conscious than those who do not.
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Figure 4: Box-and-Whisker plot for guessing number strength (log-scale) compared
to security/privacy response where: SD is “Strongly Disagree,” D is “Disagree,” N is
“Neither Disagree nor Agree,” A is “Agree,” and SA is “Strongly Agree.”
Disagree/Strongly Disaggree Agree/Strongly Agree U-Test Cohen-d
Q1 µ = 2568.30,σ = 8935.48,N = 56 µ = 7111.18,σ = 32861.65,N = 351 *p= 0.011 d=0.148
Q2 µ = 3293.11,σ = 8799.23,N = 150 µ = 4609.32,σ = 20723.04,N = 201 p= 0.392 d=0.079
Q3 µ = 4218.82,σ = 20383.17,N = 184 µ = 6801.41,σ = 33295.58,N = 166 p= 0.188 d=0.094
Q4 µ = 1496.86,σ = 2688.57,N = 51 µ = 7028.29,σ = 33289.51,N = 339 p= 0.238 d=0.178
Q5 µ = 5974.97,σ = 15860.97,N = 32 µ = 6285.81,σ = 31447.69,N = 378 p= 0.418 d=0.010
Q6 µ = 3450.97,σ = 10158.65,N = 146 µ = 8277.26,σ = 39266.21,N = 235 *p= 0.010 d=0.153
Q7 µ = 3499.11,σ = 10800.16,N = 35 µ = 6629.40,σ = 31722.95,N = 377 p= 0.296 d=0.102
Table 7: Significance testing for self-reported pattern strength based on agree-
ment/disagreement with question prompt. Significance testing performed using Mann-
Whitney U-test as guessing numbers are not normally distributed. The effect size was
calculated considering groups of unequal size.
We attempted to control for this effect by allowing participants to opt-out of reporting
their pattern directly, and in comparing those two groups (reported patterns vs. stats)
we did not see any differences in the responses to the privacy prompts, suggesting that
within the groups there is a diversity of privacy attitudes. This control does not account
for measurements of individuals who chose not to participate at all and avoided the
survey due to privacy concerns.
It is acknowledged that this study focuses solely on graphical password choices,
rather than the range of unlock authentication mechanisms used on mobile devices
(i.e., text-based password and PIN/passcodes). The focus on graphical passwords was
thought to be a reasonable choice given prior-published guessing/security metrics exist
for Android’s unlock pattern that would allow for ready-made comparisons. We do
expect that similar results would likely hold for other unlock authentication options.
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For purposes of analysis, we examined participant agreement/disagreement with
statements regarding the information privacy of mobile phones, similar to that of a
Westin Scale. The Westin Scale has been examined extensively by researchers in
order to determine the merits of comparing self-report vs observed behavior data
regarding privacy practices [22], enabling researchers to categorize individuals into
privacy groups [42]. While there have been some challenges identified using such
scales (e.g., between the correlation between categories and behavioral intent, and
between the Westin categories and consequences), the same researchers have found that
segmentations derived from the results may help to reveal deeper insights into views
about privacy [42]. Other researchers have questioned the applicability of the scale (e.g.,
[24]), and the limitations imposed by its unidimensional nature compared with other
scales [16]. However, according to [26], described by [16], it is still a useful tool that
researchers use to examine how privacy attitudes evolve over time. Further work would
be undertaken to better understand the limitations of the scale.
We also acknowledge throughout that the effect size and power of many of the
statistical tests are limited. We believe that this work shows that there is a potential
connection between privacy attitude and unlock authentication strength. There are many
factors, both in the choice of the privacy scale and the choice (and construction/training)
of the guessability metric that limit the scope of the results. Further analysis of this
connection would need to be performed to make stronger conclusions.
Finally, there is a limitation in that this data was collected in the Fall of 2015, before
the FBI and Apple incident involving the unlocking of the San Bernardino terrorist’s
iPhone [29]. It may be the case that individuals are more privacy sensitive if the study
were re-run today given the publicity of government surveillance, particularly to Q7. It
would be interesting future work to compare these results to a similar study conducted
in the current climate regarding the privacy of mobile devices.
8 Conclusion
To conclude, we analyzed a dataset collected via an online survey on Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk of participants agreement/disagreement with a set of seven security/privacy
prompts related to information security on mobile devices. Analyzing the responses
using principal component analysis (PCA) revealed two factor-solutions. We further
analyzed the solutions’ weighting and responses to individual questions based on de-
mographic breakdowns, willingness to reveal or not reveal an unlock pattern, and the
strength of the unlock pattern if revealed.
Originally, we hypothesized that (H1) there is a relationship between the responses
to the security/privacy prompts and the strength of the reported authentication stimuli,
and (H2) that there is a relationship between the participants’ demographic information
(e.g., age, location of residence) and the responses to the security/privacy prompts.
In regards to H1, we were unable to find sufficient evidence to accept or reject H1
outright. We found weak evidence, potentially inconclusive evidence with regard to
one of our factor solutions (F1), in support of H1, but the effect size and the correlation
results are not significant. Our second factor solution (F2) showed no significant
differences between those that revealed and those that did not reveal their unlock pattern,
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but again, this does not allow us to draw conclusions regarding the relationship between
pattern strength and security/privacy attitudes. Further research would be needed and
perhaps a modification to either the security/privacy prompts or the security metric, or
both.
However, while we were unable to identify larger trends that include the entire set
of security/privacy prompts, we did find that individual questions provided significant
differences in the security of reported unlock patterns. Both Q1 (concern for privacy of
data on mobile devices) and Q6 (concern about unauthorized access by known actors)
proved to divide the groups well where those who agreed more strongly selected stronger
patterns. This suggests that modifications to the mobile device specific security/privacy
prompts should include questions that explore this connection further.
While results for H1 are inconclusive, we are able to accept H2. There are demo-
graphic differences in the responses to the security/privacy prompts, particularly as it
relates to both of our factor solutions (F1 and F2). With respect to place of residence,
when applying F1, we find that both urban and rural participants have similar privacy
responses (more privacy conscious) that differ from sub-urban participants (less privacy
conscious). When considering age, F2 showed very strong differences in the responses
as participants got older, and based on the weighting, we believe this relates to the
responses to Q1 (concern about privacy), Q4 (identify threat), and Q5 (online privacy)
which older participants had more agreement with.
Based on these findings, we believe that incorporating some or all of the secu-
rity/privacy prompts as a short survey within the password creation process could help
inform a system or policy makers on how to better personalize the selection process.
For example, if Android used a similar prompt during initialization, the information
from that response can nudge users who are more casual about information security and
privacy towards stronger authenticator.
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